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Who Will Regulate Class Action Lawyers?
Nancy J. Moore*
INTRODUCTION
In 2003, I published an article entitled “Who Should Regulate Class
Action Lawyers?” 1 In that article, I defended the decision of the
American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Commission on Evaluation of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Ethics 2000 Commission”),
for which I was Chief Reporter, not to propose any substantial
amendments to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model
Rules”) concerning the ethical conduct of class action lawyers. 2
There are many ethical issues that confront class action lawyers. 3 In
my 2003 article, I focused on conflicts of interest—an issue that courts
and commentators have had difficulty resolving and a subject on which
I have frequently written. 4
My defense of the Ethics 2000
* Professor of Law and Nancy E. Barton Scholar, Boston University Law School.
1. Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1477
[hereinafter Moore, Who Should Regulate?].
2. The Ethics 2000 Commission made this decision in the context of suggestions by several
commentators that the Model Rules should specifically address the ethical conduct of class action
lawyers. See sources cited id. at 1479 n.16 (discussing proposals by Brian Waid and Richard
Zitrin). For criticism of this decision, see Mohsen Manesh, The New Class Action Rule:
Procedural Reforms in an Ethical Vacuum, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 923, 946 (2005) (“Rather
than deferring to procedural requirements, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ought to
specifically address the duties of class action lawyers.”) (footnotes omitted). But cf. Debra Lyn
Bassett, When Reform is Not Enough: Assuring More Than Merely “Adequate” Representation in
Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 961 (2004) (concluding that modifications of the Model Rules
are unnecessary in the class action context because the problem is not that the Model Rules have
failed but that, “for the most part, they have not been tried”).
3. These issues include solicitation, application of the no-contact rule, the reasonableness of
attorneys’ fees, and the attorney-witness rule. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1,
at 1477 & nn.2–3, 1478 & n.4 (noting issues class action lawyers frequently encounter).
4. Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1481–82. See, e.g., Janine Griffiths-Baker
& Nancy J. Moore, Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Global Law Firms: Peace in Our Time?,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541 (2012) (discussing how to regulate lawyers in a global practice);
Nancy J. Moore, Regulating Law Firm Conflicts in the 21st Century: Implications of the
Globalization of Legal Services and the Growth of the “Mega Firm,” 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
521 (2005) (comparing approaches to professional responsibility problems in the United States
and the United Kingdom); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Emerging
Issues in the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 497 (1998) (exploring
conflicts issues that in-house counsel face); Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer
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Commission’s decision began with an attempt to narrow the scope of
the problem. First, I argued that the class should be viewed as a type of
entity client, rather than an aggregation of individual clients or quasiclients with actual or potentially conflicting interest. 5 If the client is the
class itself, then the class lawyer can ignore intra-class conflicts that
might otherwise pose an ethical problem under conflict of interest rules,
such as Model Rule 1.7. 6 Of course, intra-class conflicts do raise
important questions concerning the adequacy of representation under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 but they do not, and
should not, come within the purview of Model Rule 1.7.
Second, to further narrow the scope of the problem, I argued that
conflict of interest rules like Model Rule 1.7 do not address the type of
conflict inherent in all principal-agent relationships; that is, the lawyer’s
temptation to favor her own interest in securing a large fee at the
expense of the client’s—in this case the class’s—interest in recovering a
large damage award. 8 These “agency problems” 9 are endemic to all
lawyer-client relationships and are addressed by other ethics rules, such
as Model Rule 1.5, which requires reasonable legal fees. 10 These
problems are also addressed whenever a court determines what fee to
award a lawyer representing a class. 11 Model Rule 1.7, however, is
Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541 (1997) (offering support for the American Law
Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers treatment of conflicts of interest);
Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1819 (1996) (describing situations in which lawyers may encounter conflicts of interest issues
when representing children); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous
Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and
Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1982) (arguing for a new general standard based upon client
capacity for informed and voluntary consent); Nancy J. Moore, Disqualification of an Attorney
Representing Multiple Witnesses before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense,
27 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1979) (exploring the ethical issues raised by multiple representation of
grand jury witnesses and suggesting possible standards for the disqualification of a common
attorney).
5. Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1482–89 (arguing that viewing the class as
an entity client lends itself to more efficient application of ethics rules).
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1051 (discussing
the need to address the protection of the class against conflict not only with respect to the
lawyer’s obligations, but also with respect to conflicts within the class).
8. Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1490–91.
9. Id. at 1490.
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a).
11. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies
and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119
(2000) (proposing greater judicial intervention to prevent lawyers from putting their own
financial interests above the interests of their clients and obtaining unreasonably large fee awards
and reimbursement for unreasonable costs and expenses in class actions and other mass tort
lawsuits).
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reserved for conflicts that arise with respect to a particular lawyer; for
example, a lawyer who represents individual clients whose interests
may conflict with the interest of the class as a whole. 12
At this point in my 2003 article, having narrowed the scope of the
problem to those types of class counsel conflicts that ordinarily present
conflict of interest problems under ethics rules such as Model Rule 1.7,
I considered a typical conflicts problem in which a lawyer
simultaneously represents a plaintiff class and individuals either inside
of or outside of the class with interests that might differ from the class
as a whole. 13 For example, in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,
class counsel represented individual clients who were not part of the
class but who had similar claims against the defendants. 14 A material
limitation conflict existed because the lawyer’s duty to increase the
amount paid to the non-class, individual clients conflicted with the
lawyer’s duty to increase the amount available to the class. 15
Concerning the risk to the individual clients, I argued that Model
Rule 1.7 should apply in full force. 16 In other words, if there is a
significant risk that the lawyer’s duty to the class will materially limit
the lawyer’s representation of the individuals, then the individuals are
entitled to full disclosure of the existence and implications of the
conflict. 17 Of course, under Model Rule 1.7, the individual clients are
12. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1491 (discussing specific examples of
conflicts of interest with respect to a particular lawyer, such as a previous relationship with the
defendant). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (discussing personal conflicts of
interest).
13. Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1493–98.
14. 157 F.R.D. 246, 293–94 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997). For a discussion of Georgine and how the case illustrated the application of
Model Rule 1.7 to conflicts between the class and non-class clients with claims similar to the
class, see Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1498–500.
15. Model Rule 1.7 describes two types of conflicts of interest: a directly adverse conflict, in
which the lawyer will be representing one client in a matter “directly adverse to another client,”
even when the lawyer does not represent the other client in that matter, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1), and a material limitation conflict, in which “there is a significant risk that
the lawyer’s representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibility to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer.” Id. R. 1.7(a)(2). In Georgine, a material limitation existed because the defendants
almost certainly had limited resources with which to satisfy all plaintiffs and wanted to keep their
total exposure as low as possible. See 157 F.R.D. at 263 (“[F]acing enormous liabilities and
overwhelming costs to defend thousands of asbestos-related claims, many asbestos producers
were on the road to bankruptcy, including a number of companies previously considered to be
immune from financial difficulty.”).
16. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1492–98 (arguing a lawyer must
avoid representing potential conflicting interests “by informing existing clients of the risks” of
taking on a class as an additional client). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e)
(2012) (providing a definition of informed consent under the Model Rules).
17. For example, in Tedesco v. Mishkin, class counsel simultaneously represented a class and
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entitled to give their informed consent to the conflict, in which case the
lawyer may proceed with the conflicted representation. 18
The problem concerning the risk to the class, however, is that no
mechanism currently exists by which the lawyer may inform the class of
conflicted representation and receive its consent. 19 If Model Rule 1.7
applies to this aspect of the conflict, then the most likely answer is that
the representation simply cannot proceed because the class client has
not given its informed consent. 20 But in my view this is not a
satisfactory solution because often the conflict is minimal, and there
may be advantages to proceeding with that particular lawyer; for
example, the lawyer’s familiarity with the underlying facts and legal
questions as a result of her existing representation of the individual
clients may offer a significant benefit to the class. 21
I then concluded that the problem could be solved in one of two
ways. First, state courts could rewrite the ethical conflicts rules—for
example, a state’s version of Model Rule 1.7—to take account of this
issue. 22 Second, class action law could trump rules of professional
conduct in these situations, in which case judges supervising class
actions should address the risks to the class when determining the
adequacy of class counsel’s representation under Rule 23 or its state
equivalents. 23
In my 2003 article, I expressed a strong preference for the second
option, arguing that ethics code drafters have neither the experience nor
the authority to determine the appropriate relationships between class
an individual member of the class who, as co-trustee of one of the investments funds at issue,
could have been named as an additional defendant. 689 F. Supp. 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Acknowledging the conflicts of interest, the court removed the co-trustee as a named
representative of the class, but refused to disqualify class counsel; instead, the court directed that
class counsel withdraw from representing the co-trustee on an individual basis. Id. at 1330. My
opinion is that class counsel violated Model Rule 1.7 when he failed to adequately inform the cotrustee of the risks involved in the simultaneous representation of the co-trustee and the class of
which he was a member.
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b).
19. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1499–1500 (explaining that class
entities “do not currently have such a decisional mechanism”).
20. See id. at 1483 (explaining the general ethical rule addressing concurrent conflicts of a
lawyer and the requirement of obtaining informed consent from each affected client). But see
Sharp v. Next Entm’t, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 47, 54 (Ct. App. 2008) (deciding against
disqualifying class counsel on the grounds that the class representatives effectively waived class
counsel’s conflict of interest on behalf of the absent members of the class).
21. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1500–01.
22. See id. at 1479 n.16 (citing proposals for amendments to the Model Rules).
23. See id. at 1501–03 (explaining that class action law should clearly require courts to
consider class counsel’s conflicts as a substantial factor in determining the adequacy of
representation under Rule 23).
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counsel and the class. 24 Moreover, because courts supervising class
actions already have an obligation to monitor the adequacy of class
counsel representation, they are clearly in the best position to address
any threat to the adequacy of that representation when class counsel has
an ethical conflict arising from the simultaneous representation of one
or more non-class clients. 25
I. RECENT ACTIVITY (AND THE ABSENCE THEREOF)
Since the publication of my article nearly a decade ago, there have
been several developments (or non-developments) that bear on my
arguments and my proposed solution.
First, there has been no clear resolution of the identity of class
counsel’s client; that is, whether class counsel represents the class as an
entity client or the individual members of the class (or even whether
class counsel has any client at all, in the meaningful sense of that
term). 26 Indeed, some problems with the entity theory have been raised
with respect to the conduct of class counsel, not only prior to class
certification but also during the time prior to the filing of a class action
lawsuit. 27 For example, whom does a lawyer represent when the lawyer
purports to negotiate the settlement of a potential class action claim
when no lawsuit has yet been filed?
I have served as an expert witness in several cases in which this
situation arose. In one case, former plaintiffs’ lawyer Melvyn Weiss 28
24. Id. See also Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2004-01 (2004) [hereinafter N.Y.C. Ethics Op. 2004-1), available at http://
www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2004-opinions/814-lawyers-in-class-actions (stating
that the Committee lacked “both the jurisdiction and the ability to promulgate an authoritative
theory of class action representation”).
25. In addition to conflicts with other current clients, material limitation conflicts may arise
under Rule 1.7 when a lawyer has conflicting personal interests or when the lawyer owes
conflicting duties to others, including former clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.7(a)(2) (2012).
26. See, e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939,
1941–946 (2011) (discussing the two categorizations of the identity of the class: an aggregation
of individuals or an entity); cf. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Self-Interest, Public Interest, and the Interests
of the Absent Client: Legal Ethics and Class Action Praxis, 49 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 13–24
(2011) (discussing a similar issue under Canadian law).
27. This issue was also addressed in my 2003 article. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?,
supra note 1, at 1486 (“Who is the lawyer’s client prior to certification? Must it be the named
representatives?”).
28. Weiss pleaded guilty to a federal racketeering charge in 2008 in connection with a twentyfive year kickback scheme designed to bring class action clients to his firm. Tom Gilroy,
Criminal Conduct: Melvyn Weiss of Milberg Weiss Agrees to Plead Guilty in Legal Kickback
Case, 24 LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT (BNA) 174, 174–75 (2008). He was subsequently
disbarred. Carolyn Whetzel, Criminal Conduct: Milberg Weiss Co-Founder Sentenced to 2-1/2
Years for Kickback Schemes, 24 LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT (BNA) 295, 295 (2008).
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negotiated the settlement of a potential class action without having filed
a class action lawsuit or even signed up potential class representatives.29
Although he had individual clients with similar claims, Weiss
apparently did not discuss with them the fact that he was negotiating a
settlement of their claims in the context of a broad class action until the
negotiations were complete. 30 When questioned about his obligations
to the putative class at the time he was negotiating a settlement of its
claims, Weiss responded that he had no duty to the class because prior
to the filing of a lawsuit, no class existed. 31
Second, new questions have arisen concerning the precise nature of
the relationship between class counsel and the named representatives of
a class, particularly during the interim period when a class-wide
settlement is being negotiated but no class action lawsuit has been filed.
Consider the following hypothetical based on another case in which I
served as an expert witness. 32 A woman signs an individual
representation agreement with a lawyer. The agreement identifies the
woman as a client, but also advises her that if and when a class action
lawsuit is filed, she will become a class representative with the limited
ability to direct or fire the lawyer for the class.
Assume that the lawyer then begins negotiating with the potential
29. See Simon v. KPMG LLP, No. 05-CV-3189 (DMC), 2006 WL 1541048, at *9–10 (D.N.J.
June 2, 2006) (approving the settlement with brief reference to an earlier motion to disqualify
class counsel based on allegations of conflicting interests); Transcript of Proceedings at 23–52,
Simon v. KPMG LLP (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2005) (No. 00-6003) [hereinafter Weiss Transcript] (on
file with author) (testimony of Melvin Weiss in hearing). Weiss had individual clients but
apparently had not consulted with any of them concerning his class-wide negotiations with the
defendant. See supra note 28 and infra notes 30–31, and accompanying texts (discussing Weiss’s
belief that he had the freedom to negotiate with the defendants on behalf of his individual clients
and his belief that there was no class).
30. Weiss Transcript, supra note 29, at 30–31. When asked who had given their permission
for Weiss to negotiate a class-wide settlement, Weiss responded, “Our clients always give us the
freedom to negotiate resolutions with the defendants who they are suing, and we use our best
judgments to get the best result for them.” Id.
31. See id. at 35.
32. Bartle v. Berry, 953 N.E.2d 243 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (concerning two class attorneys,
one of their firms, and a former class representative, each of whom filed multiple complaints
against other attorneys who had filed separate class action lawsuits resulting in the withdrawal of
a tentative class action settlement). I was retained by the plaintiffs in that lawsuit after I testified
in a related action that went to trial, resulting in a multimillion dollar verdict for the plaintiffs.
See Glenwood Farms, Inc. v. Ivey, No. 03-CV-217-P-S, 2006 WL 521852, at *1 (D. Me. Mar. 2,
2006) (holding that the defendants’ objections to Nancy Moore’s expert report were untimely and
therefore denied); Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, $10 Million Legal Malpractice Poland Springs
Verdict, N.Y. ATT’Y MALPRACTICE BLOG (Feb. 15, 2007), http://blog.bluestonelawfirm.com
/articles-10-million-legal-malpractice-poland-springs-verdict.html. In Bartle, the court affirmed
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on various grounds, some of which were contrary
to an affidavit I had executed in an earlier proceeding. See Bartle, 953 N.E.2d at 256; Glenwood
Farms, 2006 WL 521852, at *1.
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defendant to settle the claims of the putative class. The woman
becomes dissatisfied with the lawyer, and attempts to fire that lawyer
and hire a different lawyer to continue the negotiations. The lawyer
withdraws from the negotiation, as requested, but then begins to
represent other individual consumers, in other states. Then, the lawyer
files class action lawsuits on behalf of these other consumers against the
same company, over the express objection of the woman, who is
justifiably concerned that the company will walk away from a tentative
settlement if hostile lawsuits are filed at that time.
In the several related malpractice cases in which I served as an
expert, 33 the lawyer 34 argued that his actions were justified by a
continuing obligation to the putative class. 35 In my view, once he was
discharged by the woman, the lawyer owed no such obligation. I
further opined that the lawyer failed to adequately confront and resolve
the conflict of interests between his new class representative clients and
the woman who was now his former client. 36
Third, another variation on ethical conflicts in class actions that has
received increasing attention in recent years is what Richard Stuhan and
33. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
34. There were actually several lawyers and their law firms who were defendants in those
cases, but for purposes of simplicity, I refer to a single lawyer in discussing the hypothetical and
the actual case. In addition, there were multiple plaintiffs, including not only the former class
representative, but also the lawyers who represented the individual plaintiffs, and, in the
Glenwood lawsuit, individual businesses that had similar complaints against the same defendant
but that were not members of the consumer class. The plaintiff lawyers, as well as the defendantlawyers, were simultaneously representing both the individual businesses and the putative class.
See Glenwood Farms, 2006 WL 521852, at *1; Bartle, 953 N.E.2d at 246.
35. In Bartle, the Massachusetts Appeals Court interpreted the woman’s attorney-client
representation agreement as conceding that the defendant lawyers had a primary duty to the
consumer class, rather than to her personally. 953 N.E.2d at 254–55. The court did not address
the fact that this part of the contract referred to a situation in which a class action lawsuit had
been filed. Id. The court further found that once the defendant lawyers had been fired by the
woman and retained by new class representatives, the lawyers owed a duty to the class as a
whole. Id. at 255. The court did not address the question of whether the lawyer continued to owe
a duty to the class during that interim period before being retained by the new class
representatives or the question of whether agreeing to represent the new class representatives
created a conflict of interest with their former client. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm.,
Formal Op. 275 (Nov. 19, 1997), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/
legal_ethics/opinions/opinion275.cfm [hereinafter D.C. Bar Op. 275] (concluding that law firm
contacted by potential class action plaintiff may not, after failing to agree on terms of
engagement, seek to identify another client to represent in the same or substantially related
matter).
36. See, e.g., Affidavit of Professor Nancy J. Moore, Bartle v. Berry, 953 N.E.2d 243 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2011) (No. 06-1858-BLS1). In my affidavit I also addressed conflicts of interest
relating to the defendant lawyers’ simultaneous representation of both the individual business
clients and the class, and the effect of that multiple representation on the propriety of filing class
action lawsuits on behalf of their new clients. Id. These conflicts were not addressed by the
Bartle court.
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Sean Costello describe as “sibling class actions,” in which a lawyer files
separate class action lawsuits against the same defendant in different
courts, often on unrelated matters. 37 Stuhan and Costello argue that the
filing of such lawsuits should be presumed to be inadequate
representation under Rule 23, 38 but this contention may not be
appropriate in all cases. 39 In any event, the legal malpractice cases I
just described involved sibling class actions; that is, the lawyers filed
multiple class actions on behalf of different class representatives in
different states. 40 It is unclear in these cases whether the current class
representatives were aware of each other’s existence and whether they
had given their informed consent to the filing of separate class action
lawsuits. It is possible, however, that they gave their informed consent,
and therefore the actions were not competing, but rather were part of a
single, overall strategy of attempting to maximize the possibility of
finding a court that would treat their claims favorably. Even if this was
the case, it is questionable whether any such informed consent would be
binding on the putative class once the lawsuits were filed.
Fourth, there has been much less development than I had hoped with
respect to case law addressing the adequacy of representation when
class counsel has an ethical conflict of interest of the type I have
described. As Stuhan and Costello recently observed, this may be
because Federal Rule 23(g), adopted in 2003, governs the appointment
37. See Richard G. Stuhan & Sean P. Costello, Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: The Conflict of
Interest Problem in Sibling Class Actions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1195, 1198 (2008)
(narrowly defining “sibling class actions” and proposing that bringing these kinds of class action
suits against the same defendant raises a serious conflict of interest problem for the class
attorneys). See generally Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461
(2000) (discussing the problems created by multiple class actions filed on behalf of the same class
or overlapping classes, and proposing potential legislative solutions).
38. See Stuhan & Costello, supra note 37, at 1199 (arguing that, because of competing class
interests, the lawyer cannot escape “divided loyalties, [and therefore] cannot adequately represent
any of the classes she purports to represent”). According to the authors, the presumptively
inadequate nature of the dual representation follows from their characterization of the problem as
“structural,” although they do not explain what they mean by the use of that term. Id. This term
is used in a similarly confusing manner in the recently adopted ALI Principles of Aggregate
Litigation. See AM. LAW. INST.. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §
2.07(a)(1) & cmt. d (2010). For my criticism of the use of this term when referring to conflicts of
interest in class actions, see Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the ALI’s Principles
of the Law of Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportunity—and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
717, 724–28 (2011).
39. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing material limitations on a class
counsel’s conflict of interests).
40. In those cases, however, there was the added complication that the lawyer’s former client
was attempting to negotiate a class action settlement (through another lawyer) with the same
defendant concerning the same claims. See supra note 32 (discussing my expert witness service
in Bartle and Glenwood).
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of class counsel but fails to mention class counsel’s conflicts as a factor
a judge must consider in appointing class counsel. 41 Of course, such a
factor may be considered, along with “any other matter pertinent to
counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interest[s] of a
class,” but there is nothing in the rule itself that directs a judge’s
attention to the significance of inter-class conflicts, as distinguished
from intra-class conflicts. 42 As a result, such conflicts rarely come to
the court’s attention unless they are raised by opposing counsel, which
is unlikely to occur when class counsel and the defendant have already
negotiated a class-wide settlement.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RECENT ACTIVITY
These recent developments have not changed my basic analysis of the
issues addressed in my 2003 article, although they have certainly caused
me to think more deeply with respect to both pre-filing conflicts of
interest and sibling class actions. More importantly, the ongoing
uncertainty with respect to the questions presented here has led me to
focus more of my attention on possible solutions.
First, I continue to believe that class counsel should be viewed as
representing the class as a whole, as a form of entity, not only in the
time period subsequent to the filing of a class action lawsuit, but also
any time before the filing when the lawyer is actually negotiating a
class-wide lawsuit. A recent New York City Bar Committee on
Professional and Judicial Ethics (the “N.Y.C. Bar Ethics Committee”)
opinion concluded that it does not matter whether the lawyer is viewed
as representing the class as an entity or whether each class member is
considered to be a client, a quasi-client or merely a non-client to whom
the lawyer owes fiduciary duties. 43 The N.Y.C. Bar Ethics Committee
determined that labels are insignificant because the obligations of class
counsel can be addressed on an issue-by-issue basis. 44
I disagree. In my opinion, it is a bad idea to tell class counsel that
they have no real client. 45 William S. Lerach, a well-known plaintiffs’
41. See Stuhan & Costello, supra note 37, at 1203–05.
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(c)(ii) (“In appointing class counsel, the court may consider
any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the class.”).
43. N.Y.C. Ethics Op. 2004-01, supra note 24, at *1.
44. Id. at *4. The Ethics Committee also noted that it lacked “both the jurisdiction and the
ability to promulgate an authoritative theory of class action representation.” Id.
45. Once the class action lawsuit is filed, a class representative is not necessarily an individual
client in any meaningful sense of the term, although he or she might be, depending on the nature
of the retention agreement. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1497. This is
least likely to occur in consumer class actions where individual members do not have a
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class action lawyer, 46 famously described the key to his success by
boasting, “I have the greatest law practice in the world. I have no
clients.” 47 I would much rather send class counsel a very different
message: “Yes, you do have a client, and that client is the class itself.” 48
Second, I continue to believe that individual clients of a lawyer
deserve the full protection of the rules of professional conduct,
including conflict of interest rules such as Model Rule 1.7. Whether
individuals who may or will serve as class representatives are traditional
clients of the lawyer should depend largely on the reasonable
expectations of these individuals. On the one hand, as in my earlier
hypothetical in Part I, if a lawyer signs an individual client retention
agreement with a potential class representative, then in my view that
individual is a traditional client, that is, up until the time that the lawyer
files a class action lawsuit. At that time, class representatives lose some
of the attributes of a traditional client, which the lawyer is obligated to
explain at the time of the initial retention. 49 On the other hand, if a
lawyer does not want to form a traditional lawyer-client relationship
with a potential class representative—for example, when the individual
has a small claim that cannot be prosecuted except in a class action—
significant financial stake in any potential financial award. See id. In any event, once a lawsuit is
filed, the class representatives are clearly limited in their ability to direct the lawyer. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1) advisory committee’s note (class representatives have no “unfettered
right to ‘fire’ class counsel” and may not “command class counsel to accept or reject a settlement
proposal”).
46. Lerach, a former partner of Melvyn Weiss, also pleaded guilty in connection with the
same kickback scheme in which Weiss was involved. See Michael Parrish, Leading Class-Action
Lawyer is Sentenced to Two Years in Kickback Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/business/12legal.html. Like Weiss, Lerach was disbarred.
See Lerach on Discipline (Feb. 10, 2009) (No. S169139), available at http://appellatecases.
courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=1900817&doc_no=S169139.
47. Karen Donovan, Huh? I’m the Lead Plaintiff?, THE NAT’L L.J., May 24, 1999, at A8
(quoting Lerach’s comments to Forbes magazine).
48. Although she does not necessarily share my view of the class as an entity client, Professor
Alexandra Lahav agrees that it is problematic to view a lawyer as “unmoored from a client.” See
Lahav, supra note 26, at 1940, 1946 (proposing an alternative view of “the class [as] a phantom
client created by an act of the lawyer’s imagination . . . to better understand the tensions and
inconsistences in the procedural law,” instead of the typical disconnected relationship between
lawyer and client in class action suits). The debate among commentators concerning the entity
theory of representation in class action continues unabated. See, e.g., David Marcus, Some
Realism about Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1987–97 (2008) (thoroughly discussing the
arguments of both entity theory proponents and opponents and largely siding with the
proponents); Bassett, supra note 2, at 974 n.232 (noting and explaining disagreement with the
entity theory of class action representation).
49. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1497–98; cf. N.Y.C Ethics Op. 200401, supra note 24, at *2 (explaining that a lawyer should consult with clients about the advantages
and disadvantages of a class action, including obligations clients will have in representing other
class members).
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then the lawyer may not owe that individual the duties owed to current,
former, or even prospective clients, but only if the lawyer has made it
clear from the outset precisely what the relationship entails. 50 In either
event, if the lawyer begins negotiating with a defendant to settle
potential class claims, then he or she also owes duties to the putative
class (as a prospective client), regardless of whether a class action
lawsuit has been filed.
Third, as for sibling class actions, there may or may not be conflicts
of interest under Model Rule 1.7, depending on the likelihood that the
lawyer’s duties to either class will be limited by the lawyer’s duties to
the other class. 51 If there is a conflict of interest, then I agree with
Stuhan and Costello that the conflict is one that ought to be resolved as
a matter of class action law under Rule 23’s requirement of adequate
class representation. 52
At this point, the most important issue for me is not precisely how
these ethical conflicts are resolved, but rather that they be resolved in
some fashion. The question then is how, when, and what stakeholder
50. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1497. If, however, the person has
revealed confidential information to the lawyer in the process of exploring the possibility of
forming a lawyer-client relationship, then the lawyer may owe the person the duties typically
owed by a lawyer to a prospective client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18
(2009); D.C. Bar Op. 275, supra note 35.
51. See, e.g., Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 829–31 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding a
material limitation conflict when a legal services organization represented two separate plaintiff
classes suing the state for inadequate housing facilities when the state made an offer to one class
to temporarily house its members on grounds currently occupied by members of the second class
over the objection of members of the second class). When two otherwise separate classes are
suing for monetary relief on unrelated claims, a material limitation conflict should arise only
when there is a genuine question of whether the defendant can satisfy both sets of claims or
whether the defendant might try to settle them together. See, e.g., Kuper v. Quantum Chem.
Corp., 145 F.R.D. 80 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (conflict existed when counsel represented proposed class
of stock ownership plan participants in suit against their employer while simultaneously
representing class of bondholders in another action against employer; plaintiffs sought recovery
from common pool of assets and employees asserted that dividend payment to bondholders
“substantially denude[d] [the employer defendant] of its liquid assets and net worth”); Jackshaw
Pontiac v. Cleveland Press Publ’g Co., 102 F.R.D. 183, 192 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (finding it “not
inconceivable that the amount sought by [both plaintiff classes] will exceed the total assets” of the
defendants).
52. See Stuhan & Costello, supra note 37, at 1199 (arguing that under Rule 23, “any lawyer
who purports to bring sibling class actions should presumptively be deemed inadequate to serve
as class counsel”). In their article, Stuhan and Costello discuss primarily the adequacy of
representation under Rule 23; although they briefly mention Model Rule 1.7 as embodying the
duty of loyalty owed by lawyers to their clients, they do not further address the application of
Model Rule 1.7 with respect to the conflict between sibling class actions, except to note their
view that “as a practical matter, ethical canons such as Model Rule 1.7 are simply unworkable in
the class action context.” Id. at 1202–05. They do, however, agree that “it would be a mistake to
jettison ethical considerations in the class certification decision-making process altogether” and
that “[t]he rules, while not necessarily controlling, should inform the analysis.” Id. at 1206.
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will lead the way. Can state courts or bar ethics committees do more to
amend or interpret their rules of professional conduct? What will spur
class action courts to address these issues to a greater extent than they
have done already?
As for state courts, I continue to be wary of amending the rules of
professional conduct, given the lack of expertise among ethics code
drafters 53 and the choice of law difficulties for federal class actions
posed by the lack of uniformity among the state rules. 54 Yet, I
encourage state bar ethics committees to issue opinions addressing
conflicts of interest in class action cases, such as the recent N.Y.C. Bar
Ethics Committee opinion. 55 Although I do not agree with all of the
Committee’s conclusions, 56 it did an excellent job of addressing the
duties the lawyer owes to individual clients, including individuals who
may become class representatives. 57 In addition, the Committee agreed
with me that neither class representatives nor individual clients can
consent to a conflict. The Committee understood that conflicts affect
the interests of the class itself, and that only a court supervising a class
action lawsuit has the authority to address that question, thereby making
it clear that these are issues that class counsel is obliged to bring to the
attention of the court. 58
As for federal courts, I strongly favor at least some amendments to
Rule 23. Such amendments cannot possibly resolve all of the issues I
have raised, but they certainly can address some of them. For example,
Rule 23 (in either text or commentary) should identify the class as the
client of the lawyer, which is consistent with the existing rule and
commentary to the effect that class counsel must act in the best interests
of the class as a whole, even before class certification. 59 In addition,

53. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Ethics Op. 2004-01, supra note 24 (explaining that the ethics code
drafter lacked experience and authority to determine appropriate relationships between class
counsel and the class).
54. For a discussion of the choice of law problems presented by class actions and other forms
of aggregate litigation, in which cases may be filed in different courts and clients may reside in
different states, see Nancy J. Moore, Choice of Law for Professional Responsibility Issues in
Aggregate Litigation, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (2009).
55. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing the conclusions of the N.Y.C. Bar
Ethics Committee).
56. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
57. N.Y.C. Ethics Op. 2004-01, supra note 24, at *4.
58. Id. at *2–3.
59. See Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1, at 1486 (discussing then proposed Rule
23(g), including a statement of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee that pre-certification
activities on the part of class counsel presuppose subsequent appointment as class counsel, and
that “by later applying for such appointment counsel is representing to the court that the activities
were undertaken in the best interest of the class”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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the Rule should require judges supervising class actions to inquire about
and consider conflicts of interest arising from class counsel’s
representation of clients other than the class itself, both when initially
appointing class counsel and when reviewing the adequacy of class
counsel’s representation. Along these lines, I favor Stuhan and
Costello’s proposal that inter-class conflicts should be treated as
presumptively disqualifying or inadequate, thereby shifting the burden
to class counsel to convince the court that any such conflicts are
unlikely to adversely affect their representation of the class. 60
Even in the absence of amendments to Rule 23, federal and state
judges supervising class actions should clearly consider conflicts of
interest and other ethical issues 61 as they are monitoring the
performance of class counsel, including initial appointment and the
subsequent determination of adequacy of representation. Both class
counsel and defense counsel should raise any such conflicts issues with
the court, 62 and judges should routinely request counsel to provide them
with such information, as they are already permitted to do under Rule
23.
CONCLUSION
In 2003, I asked: “Who should regulate class action lawyers?”63
Now, almost a decade later, I am asking a slightly different question:
60. Stuhan & Costello, supra note 37, at 1200. In addition to treating sibling class conflicts in
this manner, I would include conflicts between the class and individual clients of class counsel,
including clients either inside or outside the class, and any other conflicts arising under Model
Rule 1.7. See supra note 52 (describing different material limitation conflicts under Model Rule
1.7(a)).
61. Concerning the relevance of both conflicts of interest and other ethical violations, see, for
example, In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 552, 557–58 (S.D. Ohio 2005)
(rejecting (as part of selecting class counsel) application of firm on the basis of its conflict of
interest problems as well as its “apparent transgressions” in another case in which the firm
engaged in settlement negotiations with the defendant without informing the lead plaintiff).
62. As Stuhan and Costello note, defense counsel has an interest in raising such issues because
lack of adequacy of representation may result in a collateral attack against a class judgment or
settlement. Stuhan & Costello, supra note 37, at 1209–10. Nevertheless, defense counsel does
not necessarily raise these issues, either because they are unaware of the facts or their
implications or because “they may prefer to litigate against a weak or inadequate plaintiff or
incompetent counsel.” Id. at 1210. When class counsel and defense counsel jointly submit a
proposed settlement to the court for its approval, the hearing should be viewed as an ex parte
proceeding in which both counsel have an obligation to inform the court “of all material facts
known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision.” See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (2009). See also Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen,
Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1105 (1996) (“Fairness hearings are more akin
to ex parte proceedings than adversarial ones.”).
63. See generally Moore, Who Should Regulate?, supra note 1 (exploring the ethical issues
implicated by class action litigation).
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“Who will regulate class action lawyers and when will they do so?” The
time has clearly come to begin to more seriously address and resolve the
ethical issues I raised in 2003, as well as the related issues I have
described in this Article.

